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CURRENT PROBLEMS OF FREEZING CONTROL*
ARTHUR BLOCH AND WERNER ROSENBERGt
Public attention these days is being focused on the spectacular and stirring
events of military actions, yet there are legal developments in the field of
economic defense less dramatic but nonetheless vital to the ultimate goal,
viz. the defeat of the aggressor nations. The United States of America through
all its history, fighting for, economic individualism, has now been forced to
create a system of limitations and restrictions on foreign financial transactions.
In establishing a foreign funds control, it has equipped itself with the most
important weapon in economic defense.
While some European countries established foreign funds control many years
ago, this country has now created a control system which, in effect, "subjects
to regulation and scrutiny all transactions in which blocked countries or their
nationals have any type of interest."1 But the American system did not follow
the European pattern of restrictions. The diversity of purpose made neces-
sary a decisive difference in measures and methods, not so much in funda-
mentals as in technique. Protection of the national currency against debase-
ment or inflation was the original goal of foreign exchange control in Europe,
especially as adopted in Germany.2  This self defense measure developed into
an aggressive weapon of the new economic policies which "reach their climax
* This Comment was written before the entry of the United States into the War. With
the outbreak of war the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 as amended,
became effective. Section 3 (a) of the Act prohibits any person from trading with the
enemy unless authorized by the President. On December 13, 1941, by virtue of Section
3 (a) of the Act, the President issued a general license permitting all transactions involving
German, Italian or Japanese interests already controlled or regulated by the Treasury
Department under the Freezing Control Orders. By this action the President integrated
the licensing procedure under Section 3 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act with
that of the Treasury Department under freezing control. Cf. General License Under Section
3 (a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, December 13, 1941, Federal Reserve Bank
Circular No. 2334.
Section 5 (b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act (see infra, note 10) is now amended
by Section 301 of the "First War Powers Act 1941" of December 18, 1941, Public Law 354,
77th Congress.
Section 302, the validation Section of this Act, approved, ratified and confirmed all
the orders and regulations of the freezing control.
t Dr. Arthur Bloch, Dr. of Laws, University of Greifswald. Dr. Werner Rosenberg, Dr.
of Laws, University of Breslau.
1. Edward H. Foley, Jr., General Counsel for the Treasury Dept., Freezing Control as
a Weapon of Economic Defense, address delivered before the Committee on Insurance Law,
American Bar Association, Sept. 29, 1941, reprinted in N. Y. Fed. Res. Bank Circular,
Nov., 1941.
2. Ellis, Exchange Control in Central Europe, 59 HAxvArui EcoNomC SrnMIs 290;
NUSSBAUMS, MONW 3N Tam LAw (1939) 475, 476; Binder, Prdttial Aspect of Foreign
Property Control (1941) Am-isUTRA=w LAw, No. 5, p. 2. For an up to date review of
the European Foreign exchange laws see DAS D maREm" EuRopAs (Switzerland 1941).
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in totalitarian control methods of trade and finance, designed to strengthen
war economy, a process which eventually embraced every aspect of social and
economical life."3
American currency needs no protection. The dollar today is the strongest
medium of international exchange, the most sought after medium in the world.4
In creating freezing control, the American Government had three principal aims:
1) to preserve American property of Axis-invaded countries and their
nationals;
2) to protect vital American interests in view of the unlimited national
emergency, declared by the President, by preventing the Axis powers from
benefiting by their American assets and those looted from conquered nations;5
3) to strengthen the economy and foreign exchange of friendly nations at
their own request, e.g., China.6
The effectiveness of the control is guaranteed by a system of prohibitions and
regulations, made flexible and equitable in practice by the issuance of general
and special licenses. The legal basis of the control is found in section 5 B
of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917,7 which prohibited trading with
the enemy and gave the President power to regulate and prohibit foreign
exchange transactions, transfers of credit, and of evidences of indebtedness or
ownership of property, either between the United States and a foreign country
or between residents of foreign countries and any person within the United
States.8 This wartime measure was revised and amended in 1933 to permit
its application to any period of national emergency.
3. THIESING, CONTROL OF FOREIGN OWNED PROPERTY IN TLE UNITED STATES (N. Y.
1941) 4.
4. Foley, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Press Release issued at the White House on June 14, 1941; Control of Foreign
Funds, (Aug. 1941) BANKING 24-95.
6. Foley, supra note 1, at 2. In order to assist friendly governments the Treasury
furnished copies of Netherlands' freezing regulations (N. Y. Fed. Res. Bank Circular No.
2091) and translation of Luxemburg Decree Laws (Circular Nos. 2211, 2268) to all
interested banks or parties. Before paying out Dutch funds, most American banks in
respecting these laws require licenses by the Government of the Netherlands in London.
See Davis, Federal Freezing Orders-A Transition Period (Editorial) N. Y. L. J., Sept.
25, 26, 29, 30, 1941 and Comment, Protective Expropriatory Decrees of the Governments
in Exile-Their Application in the U. S. (1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 1072; Anderson v. N. D.
Transandine, 28 N. Y. S. (2d) 547 (1941). For an analysis of the decrees of different
invaded countries and the attitude of the banks, see Strong, How Foreign Decrees Affect
Property Held by Our Banks, (Apr. 1941) BANxERs MONTHLY, see also Domke, Inter-
nctional Aspects of European Expropriation Measures (Nov. 1941) Aio cAw FOREGN LAW
AssociATiON, Proceedings No. 22.
7. 40 STAT. 415, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 6 (1917).
8. For a well founded analysis of the American treatment of alien property see
GAT INGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERIcAN TREATMNT OF AwTH ENmiy PROPERTY
(1940).
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Under the authority of this statute the first freezing order, Executive Order
8389 of April 10, 1940, hereinafter called "the Order", was issued by the Presi-
dent after the invasion of Norway and Denmark.9 The Executive Order 8389
and the regulations and general rulings issued thereunder were approved by
the Joint Resolution of Congress, on April 23, 1940, which also amended the
Trading with the Enemy Act by making far reaching additions.'0 Thereafter
new invasions made necessary the issuance of new freezing orders. On June
14, 1941, the Order was revised and extended to the Axis and the remaining
European countries with the exception of Great Britain, Ireland and Turkey."
On July 26, 1941, Japan and China were brought within the scope of the
prohibitions, and on December 9, 1941, Thailand was added to the list.12
The Order, as amended June 14, and July 26, 1941, is at present sedes
materae of the foreign funds control.' 3  The statute under the authority of
which the order was issued, to wit, section 5 B of the Trading with the Enemy
Act, has been held constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States.' 4
Some extra judicial doubts have been raised as to the constitutionality and
validity of certain provisions of the freezing order,15 but there has been no
9. Amending Executive Order 6560 (Jan. 15, 1934) FanmaAL REoisTER (April 12, 1940)
1400.
10. 54 STAT. 179, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 5(b) (1940): "During time of war or during
any other period of national emergency declared by the President, the President
may, through any agency that be may designate, or otherwise, investigate, regu-
late, or prohibit, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of
licenses or otherwise, any transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit between
or payments by or to banking institutions as defined by the President, and export, hoarding,
melting, or earmarking of gold or silver coin or bullion or currency, and any transfer,
withdrawal or exportation of, or dealing in, any evidences of indebtedness or evidences of
ownership of property in which any foreign state or a national or politican subdivision
thereof, as defined by the President, has any interest, by any person within the United
States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof; . . ."
11. Executive Order 8785 (June 14, 1941), amending Executive Order 8389.
12. Executive Order 8832 (July 26, 1941), amending Executive Order 8389 (China
and Japan). Executive Order 8963 (Dec. 9, 1941), amending Executive Order 8389
(Thailand).
13. For the legislative history of the present control system see Cdmment, Foreign Funds
Control Through Presidential Freezing Orders (1941) 41 CoL. L. REv. 1039, 1045. Binder,
supra note 2, at 5, HiNG, supra note 3, at 7.
14. Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U. S. 239 (1921); Norman v. B. & 0. R. Co., 294 U. S. 240
(1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317, 350 (1935); Campbell v. United States,
5 F. Supp. 156, 167-170, 172-174 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1936); Uebersee Finanz-Korporation,
A. G. v. Rosen, 83 F. (2d) 225, 228 (C. C. A. 2d 1936), 83; cert. denied, 298 U. S. 679
(1936); British American Tobacco Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 104 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 600 (1939).
1s. Comment, Foreign Funds Control Through Freezing Orders (1941) 41 CoL. L.
RaV. 1039, 1067 et seq.; TIEmSING, supra note 3, at 5, 23; Harris and Joseph, Present
Problem Concerning Foreign Funds Control, N. Y. L. J. Jan. 22, 23, 24, 1941, pp. 336,
354, 372.
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judicial denial of the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the statute.16
Freezing control can only be interpreted against the background of its legal
history and the public policy which led to its institution. The Order has
reopened a wide field of legal theory and practice. The wide range of the
functions in the Order, its very nature as an emergency measure, intended
to be as broad and flexible as possible, 17 have presented many difficulties to
the profession and to the public. A few court decisions construing provisions of
the Order, and learned discussions have made valuable contributions toward the
resolution of some of these problems. This comment confines itself to difficulties
heretofore not fully discussed or recognized.
The major effect of the Order is to prohibit certain transactions in which
a "national" of a blocked country has any interest. Who is a "national"?
What "transactions" are within the scope of the Order? These are questions
of paramount importance.
The Blocked Nationals
A few problems connected with the definition of a blocked "national"
will be considered first. A "national" is defined in section 5 E of the Order
as follows:
"(i) Any person who has been domiciled in, or a subject, citizen or resident
of a foreign country at any time on or. since the effective date of this Order,
"(ii) Any partnership, association, corporation or other organization, or-
ganized under the laws of, or which on or since the effective date of this Order
had or has had its principal place of business in such foreign country, or
which on or since such effective date was or has been controlled by, or a
substantial part of the stock, shares, bonds, debentures, notes, drafts, or
other securities or obligations of which, was or has been owned or controlled
by, directly or indirectly, such foreign country and/or one or more nationals
thereof as herein defined,
"(iii) Any person to the extent that such person is, or has been, since such
effective date, acting or purporting to act directly or indirectly for the benefit
or on behalf of any national of such foreign country, and
"(iv) Any person who there is reasonable cause to believe is a 'national' as
herein defined."
The term "national" in its usual meaning embraces only citizens and subjects
of a country but in the field of frozen funds control we have a much broader
concept. Since we are engaged in military and economic warfare it is only
natural that this country cannot grant comity in recognizing any foreign defini-
tion of "national" but must give the term "national" a new and broader meaning
for the purposes of this problem. There is no question that in principle, citizens
or subjects of a blocked country are "nationals" under the usual definition
as well as under the order, and form the nucleus of blocked "nationals". By
16. Brown et al. v. 3. P. Morgan, N. Y. L. J. Nov. 26, 1941, p. 1665, col. 4.
17. Foley, supra note 1, at 3, 4.
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projecting the new elements of "domicile" and "residence" into the definition
certain additional groups are included; others are excluded. A native born
American citizen with a residence or domicile in a blocked country on or after
the effective date of the blocking will be considered a "national" of that
country' s while citizens of blocked countries, residing in the United States on
and since June 17, 1940, are exempted and not blocked as "nationals" of
their country.
The Order does not mention the legal situation of "stateless" persons' 9 who
are not citizens of any country. As long as these persons were "domicilees"
or "residents" in a blocked country at the time of the blocking they are
"nationals" as defined is section 5 E of' the Order. Under General Licenses
No. 4220 and No. 42A,21 "stateless" persons who have been residing within
the United States since June 17, 1940, are classed as "generally licensed
nationals" whose accounts are free. A "stateless" person with domicile and
residence in a non-blocked country on or since the effective date of, the
order is in principle not a "national" of the blocked country, of which he
might have been a citizen in the past. To impress him with citizenship of the
country of his origin or previous residence would be absurd for the reason
that such "forced citizenship might be the very one he does not wish to have."
22
But thousands of "stateless" persons are now in transit in non-blocked
countries like England or Cuba, waiting for a chance to immigrate to the United
States or to some other country of the Western Hemisphere. Under the law
of domicile these persons have not acquired a domicile in these transitory
places for lack of intention to establish a permanent home. They do not
lose their old domicile until they have actually arrived at another place which
they intend to make their permanent abode.2 3  Therefore, a stateless person
who has left his domicile in a blocked country, even with the intention never
to return, and is temporarily a visitor or in transit in a non-blocked country,
might be considered a "national" because his domicile is still in the blocked
country. Another difficulty arose in connection with the status of "nationals"
who have been residing in the United States on and since June 17, 1940,
18. Of course, American Citizens residing in a blocked country on or since the
effective date of the blocking are almost completely freed from the effect of the freezing
orders after returning to the United States. See U. S. Treas. General License No. 28,
August 8, 1940, amended July 8, 1941; U. S. Treas. Dept., Documents Pertaining to
Foreign Funds Control (Aug. 16, 1941) 26.
19. Political developments in Europe after the last war and recent decrees of totalitarian
governments have deprived many thousands of people of their citizenship. Many of them
are personally in the United States or with property under American jurisdiction.
20. 31 CoDB or F z. R r. p. 172, col. 1.
21. N. Y. Fed. Res. Bank Circular No. 2321, Nov. 27, 1941, 31 CODn OF FED. REG. p.
131, col. 1.
22. See TaIESING, supra note 3, at 15.
23. Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 556 (1873); In re Rotholz' Estate, 164 Misc. 914, 300
N. Y. Supp. 56 (1937); Harris and Joseph, supra note 15, at part 1.
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but could not be considered as "domicilees" under the law of domicile, since
General License No. 42 issued on June 14, 1941, freed only the accounts of
persons who had been both "domicilees" and "residents" in the United States.
Many thousands of people of the yellow race who, under the present
immigration law2 4 could not immigrate into this country and so were unable to
acquire a permanent domicile, and many other people in this country on a
visitor's visa who could not immigrate because of the difficulties connected
with obtaining immigration visas were not able to meet the domicile require-
ment. These classes of "frozen nationals" are now freed under General
License No. 68 and General License No. 42A.25
Under section 5E (11) of the Order, partnership, associations, corporations
and other organizations are blocked when controlled by a blocked "national"
or a substantial part of the stocks, shares, bonds or securities have been
controlled or owned by a blocked "national" 2 6  The Order does not give
any definition of a "substantial part" of the securities nor specify the amount
of control required to bring the corporation or business organization within
the scope of the blocked "nationals". Serious doubts arose as to how much
must be owned to constitute "substantial ownership". It was suggested that
ownership must be enough to give full control 27 or that 25% owned by a
"national" might be sufficient.28
But even a holding of less than 25% might be sufficient when as a result
the national is in a position to exercise a certain control or a substantial
influence on the management of the business.
Transactions in General
Six distinct types of "transactions" are prohibited in section 1, A-F of
the Order,29 provided that as a basic requirement the interests of the United
24. 43 STAT. 155, 8 U. S. C. A. § 204 (1924).
25. See note 21 supra. General License No. 68(a) pertaining only to nationals of
China and Japan, issued July 26, 1941. On Dec. 7, 1941, the Secretary of the Treasury
revoked all licenses for the benefit of Japan or any nationals thereof. N. Y. Fed. Res.
Bank Circular No. 2326 (Dec. 7, 1941).
26. Silent partnerships are included. See Press Release of the Treasury Department
in connection with General License 73, October 9, 1941.
27. See Harris and Joseph, supra note 15, at part 3.
28. See Comment (1941) CoL. L. RrV. 1039, 1047, which arrived at this result by
an inference from the last paragraph of section 5 E which classifies the status of a
,corporation or organization where the ownership or control is split between two or
more "nationals". Here the combined ownership and control by "nationals" must amount
to 25% or more of the stocks.
. 29. Executive Order 8785, as amended, U. S. Treas., Documents Pertaining to Foreign
Funds Control reads in part as follows: "Section 1. All of the following transactions are
prohibited, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury by means of
regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, if (i) such transactions are by,
-r on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of any foreign country designated in this
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States and a blocked country are involved, as defined in section 1 (i), (ii).
There is no general definition of the term "transaction"3 0 in the Order.
The specific acts named in section 1, A, B, D and E are transfers of credit,
payments, export or withdrawal from the United States of certain valuable
metals, currency and evidences of indebtedness or ownership of property.
It is clear that these acts refer to a disposition of property. A transaction
may be an act not involving a transfer of title but merely a change of posses-
sion or custody, e.g., where somebody delivers securities or other valuables
to a bailee.
A contract or assumption of an obligation which contemplates the doing
of one of the acts above mentioned is no dispositive transaction and apparently
not affected by the prohibitions in section 1, A, B, D, E. This interpretation
may not be applied to the term "transaction" as used in section 1 F, the so-
called catch-all clause. This provision cannot operate effectively unless it
embraces contracts and obligations in certain cases where the obligation can
only be performed through a prohibited act.
Section 1 C and F uses the same expression, "transaction", as mentioned
in section 1 (i), (ii) and prohibits specifically all "transactions" in foreign
exchange within the United States and all "transactions" for the purpose of
Order, or any national thereof, or (ii) such transactions involve property in which any
foreign country designated in this Order, or any national thereof, has at any time on or
since the effective date of this Order had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direcf or
indirect:
A. All transfers of credit between any banking institutions within the United States;
and all transfers of credit between any banking institution within the United States and
any banking institution outside the United States (including any principal, agent, home
office, branch, or correspondent outside the United States, of a banking institution within
the United States);
B. All payments by or to any banking institution within the United States;
C. All transactions in foreign exchange by any person within the United States;
D. The export or withdrawal from the United States or the earmarking of gold or
silver coin or bullion or currency by any person within the United States;
E. All transfers, withdrawals or exportations of, or dealings in, any evidences of
indebtedness or evidences of ownership of property by any person within the United
States; and
F. Any transaction for the purpose or which has the effect of evading or avoiding the
foregoing prohibitions.
Section 2 of the Order, not dealt with in this article, prohibits the dealing in, acquisition
and transfer of, securities bearing a tax stamp or other stamp of a blocked country or
of any interest in securities not physically situated within the United States. The pur-
pose of Section 2 seems to be to prevent the liquidation of "looted" securities. Comment,
(1941) 41 Cot.. L. REv. 1039, 1048; U. S. Treas., General Rulings 3 and 5 pertaining to
Executive Order 8389.
30. "A transaction is whatever may be done by a person which affects another person's
rights and out of which a cause of action may arise." Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan.
399, 406 (1877).
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evading or avoiding the foregoing prohibitions or those which have that
effect (i.e., the types mentioned in section 1 A-E). The term "transaction"
in section 1, C and F, is more comprehensive than in A, B, D and E. In the
latter sections it applies merely to certain specific acts of disposition; in
the former, however, it apparently includes not only acts of disposition but
also any obligation in the performance of which a prohibited act would be
done. Mere negotiations by which a prohibited act is contemplated are not
prohibited, since the law can only be applied to acts having a recognized
legal effect.
Not only contracts,31 however, but also offers, acceptances, releases, set-offs
and other one-sided declarations are within the scope of section 1, C and F,
if these acts alone or in connection with another declaration or act already
done or to be done produce or may produce a prohibited effect. A verification
of this concept is to be found in Public Circular No. 2,32 where the Treasury
Department declares not only the payment but also the presentation or accep-
tance of drafts or other orders in which any blocked country or national
thereof has or had any interest or which are in favor or in behalf of the same
are prohibited. The "presentation" of a draft as mentioned in this Circular
is a condition precedent to the obligation to pay. The "acceptance" creates
an obligation to honor the draft or order. Both have a legally recognized
effect. The acts defined as illegal in Public Circular No. 2 can only be pro-
hibited by the catch-all clause, section 1 F, as they do not represent any
act prohibited in section 1 A-E. Apparently the acceptance of the draft is
viewed as the assumption of an obligation which cannot be performed without
a violation of the prohibitions in section 1, A-E. Whether the obligation is
actually performed or whether the performance is now practically made
impossible through the provisions A-E is therefore without importance. The
fact that sombeody assumes such an obligation is treated by the Treasury
Department as a transaction for the purpose of evading or avoiding the fore-
going prohibitions or one which has that effect. This interpretation of the
concept "transaction" is fundamental in construing the catch-all clause in
section 1 F and thereby all the other prohibitions of the Order.
Assignment
Where an assignment relates to foreign exchange it is prohibited under
section 1 C. In all other assignment cases none of the prohibitions in
section 1, A-E applies and the general view seems to be that the assignment
is valid.3 3 The result is disputable and the question arises whether the assign-
31. As to the effect upon contracts made before the enactment of the prohibitory
law and the theory of the implied term or theory of the disappearance of the basis or
foundation of the contract see McNair, Frmtration of Contract by War, (1941) 57
LAw Q. REv. 173, 174.
32. Issued August 1, 1941.
33. Comment, (1941) 41 CoL.. L. REv. 1039, 1054; TmmsING, supra note 3, at 21
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ment may not be prohibited by the catch-all clause. 4  When the transfer
of the credit in a bank to another bank is prohibited under section 1 A, it
cannot be allowed to obtain the same economic effect by an assignment made
by the creditor of the first named bank to another person. In such case the
assignment seems to be an evasion of the prohibition.
We have seen that section 1 F prohibits the acceptance of a draft. The
acceptance means the undertaking of an obligation toward an unlimited num-
ber of persons who might acquire the note by indorsement as a means of
transfer. Public Circular 2 declares this transaction to be within the scope
of the prohibitions for the obvious reason that the transfers may aggravate
or avoid the control of the asset. That reasoning seems to justify the applica-
tion of the catch-all clause to any assignment by which a similar situation is
created.
One of the tendencies of the foreign funds control is to preserve the status
quo of the blocked assets and to prohibit their passing from the secure sphere
of a controlled situation into a less secure sphere where non-blocked persons or
interests may interfere and the result might be an evasion or avoidance of
the control itself.
As to the interpretation of the regulations it cannot be overlooked that they
expressly exclude evasions by indirect device or tricks and require a wide
constriction where a transaction, seemingly innocent, can be easily used as
indirect device or trick. Should this broad interpretation include an act not
injurious to the country, a license may be applied for and will be granted by
the Treasury Department where the refusal would create hardship.35
Payment to the assignee, requires authorization by license. Commission for Polish Relief
v. Banca Nationale a Rumanie, 262 App. Div. 543, 546-7, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 690, 693-
694 (2d Dep't 1941). "It [the Order] does not prevent the assignment of the defendant's
claim against such a bank in a way conveying effectually to the assignee the title to
the claim. The prohibition as indicated extends only to the payment or transfer of the
funds. Clearly the sole purpose of the order was to prevent the funds of certain foreign
nations, including Rumania, or their nationals, from falling into the hands of the
aggressor Axis powers. To accomplish this proper result. and for no other or different
purpose, the banks in this country are prohibited from paying out or transferring
credits to such foreign nations or their nationals, without first obtaining the requirec
license from the Treasury Department. It is more than clear that neither the government
nor its Executive intended to do away with a creditor's right to attach 'frozen' or 'blocked'
funds or with the debtor's right to assign to another his claim to such funds." In Kalnin v.
Kleewen, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 15, 1941, p. 1515, col. 3, the assignment was made in Latvia.
The court held that the Order does not prohibit the making of an assignmefit outside
the United States but did not investigate whether the assignment was deemed to be
valid if made within the United States.
34. See Order, section 1 F.
35. This point of view is stressed in the English case of Stockholm Enskilda Bank v.
Schering Ltd., 57 T. L. R. 289 (1941), noted in 57 LAw Q. Rav. 162.
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Transfer of Credit, Payments and Other Transactions
Section 1 A and B prohibit banking institutions36 from transfering credits
to another bank within or without the United States and from making or
receiving payments.
The opening of an account with a bank by a blocked national is not a
transfer of credit and there is no reason why this transaction should be pro-
hibited. The account once created becomes automatically blocked and money
of a blocked national, up to this time uncontrolled, is brought under the
control of the State. On the other hand, such opening of an account is
regularly achieved by a payment or a transfer of credit, both prohibited
by section 1 A and B. As far as we can ascertain the New Yok banks
open such accounts without a license. General License No. 1 permits pay-
ments and transfers of credit to a blocked account and the inference can
be drawn that the opening of such an account is also within the scope of
this provision. However, the general license does not include transactions
in foreign exchange. Therefore, a blocked national, arriving in the United
States, cannot without a special license open a bank account by paying foreign
money to the bank, nor can he exchange the money into American dollars,
because this cannot be done since payment is a transaction falling under
section 1 C. It seems, however, that the banks treat such exchange of Ameri-
can dollars for foreign currency, not as a payment, but as a transaction,
sui generis.
Payments made by a non-blocked person to a blocked national within the
United States are not prohibited by section 1 A-E (except where the pro-
vision in F may apply). Section 5 A defines a transaction as "any payment
or transfer" to any blocked country or national. But this definition expressly
refers only to section 1 (i) and (ii) and therefore explains only the notion
"transaction" in general. It does liot increase the number of the prohibited
types of transactions in section 1 A-F. A, a non-blocked person wants to
support his friend B, a blocked national. He gives him a check for $100.
The bank cannot pay the check to B.3 7  If A himself draws the money from
his bank and pays the sum to B the transaction seems to be allowed. With this
exception, gifts are prohibited since they require actual or constructive delivery
and cannot be performed without violation of section 1 A-E. Where a gift
is made by a deed, section 1 F will apply in most instances3 8
An interesting question arises in the frequent cases where a non-blocked
American becomes the heir or legatee of a blocked national, residing abroad.
Under many European laws the heir at law or beneficiary under a will auto-
matically becomes the owner of the foreign assets.3 9 However, he retains
36. See note 29, supra.
37. Order, section 1 B.
38. Cf. Comment, (1941) 41 CoL. L. REv. 1039, 1050, n. 64.
39. Principle of sccessio universalis. "Hereditas hil alitd est, quam successio in ini-
versum js, quod defunctus habuerit." Code of Justinian (D. 57, 17, 62).
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the right to renounce the inheritance within a certain period in which case
other heirs or other persons may obtain automatically the ownership. Can
the American heir renounce his succession without a license: Or can he,
failing to get the license, be compelled to keep the assets? Where the inheri-
tance consists of real or personal property, except money, we find no prohibi-
tion of a renouncement. When it consists of foreign money, section 1 C
would apply and prohibit the renouncement as a transaction in foreign cur-
rency. As any property can be exchanged into foreign money the result is
not satisfactory, particularly as most inheritances consist of both kinds of
property and there cannot be partial acceptance and partial renouncement.
Procedural Problems
Where a complaint is brought to enforce a transaction prohibited under
the Order, the question arises whether the lack of a license is a good defense.
The, suit itself cannot be regarded as a "transaction" falling under the Order.
It represents only a method of obtaining the performance of a transaction
through the aid of the courts. May a court decree a performance which is
at present illegal and punishable and which may become unenforceable in
the event of refusal of a license? In Kalnin v. Kleewen4 ° the City Court held
that the orders "would not prevent the maintenance of a suit to determine
rights between litigants; they apply primarily to the removal of funds to a
foreign country."
The New York Supreme Court likewise denies that the Order interferes
with judicial proceedings or in itself prevents an adjudication of liability.
"Perhaps if judgment be rendered, a license to pay will be forthcoming". 41
The courts assume that the Federal Government will cooperate by licensing
the transaction in question to enable the court's judgment to be enforced. 42
Even the attachment of the defendant's bank account in, New York by
which the court obtained jurisdiction requires no license and the Order by
which the accounts are "blocked" or "frozen" is held not to have rendered
those accounts unattachable.43  A different view seems to operate in Bollack
v. Societe Pour Favoriser le Developpement du Commerce.44  The plaintiff
sued for conversion to recover from the defendant, a French Corporation doing
40. N. Y. L. J. Nov. 15, 1941, p. 1515, col. 3.
41. Sabl v. Laenderbank, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 29, 1941, p. 1268, col. 7. The court applies
this rule with reference to the Austrian Foreign Exchange Laws promulgated by Germany,
but apparently applies the same rule to the question of a license by the Federal Reserve
Bank; the necessity of such a license is not even mentioned.
42. Milbert v. Parent, N. Y. L. J., March 5, 1941, p. 999, col. 2. In case of refusal
of a license by the Federal Reserve Bank there is no resort to the courts of New York
since the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction. Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve
Bank of N. Y., 286 N. Y. 503, 37 N. E. (2d) 225 (1941).
43. Commission for Polish Relief v. Banca Nationale Rumaniei, 262 App. Div. 543, 30
N. Y. S. (2d) 690 (2d Dep't 1941).
44. N. Y. L. J., Sept. 4, 1941, p. 494, col. 4.
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business in New York, the possession of securities delivered to it at New
York City for plaintiff's account or the value thereof and damages for the
detention. The first defense was that the plaintiff as a French national was
deprived of the securities, deposited in New York, by a confiscation decree of
the French government. The second defense was that the plaintiff had not
procured a license from the Secretary of State for the transfer of the securities.
The court denied the motion to strike out both defenses. 45 As to the second
defense the court held that a demand is a prerequisite to both an action
for replevin and conversion and since there can be no transfer of the securities
without license, the defense may be directed only to showing a valid excuse
for failure to comply with a demand. Thus, the court insists that the plaintiff
should apply to the Federal Reserve Bank for a license before any "demand"
can be made on a defendant who declines to perform for quite another un-
alterable reason, to wit: confiscation which cannot be eliminated by the
license. The demand is hardly a transaction under section 1 or 2 of the
Order. A license was only required for the performance. Furthermore, we
should not impose a duty on the plaintiff to apply for a useless license
nor on the Federal Reserve Bank to investigate cases where the allegedly
liable person declines the performance for reasons outside the foreign funds
control. The better view seems to be to hold the defense as insufficient unless
the defendant alleges that he was ready, willing and able to perform under
a license.4 6
In Brown and Ano v. J. P. Morgan & Co., Inc.,47 funds of a blocked national
on deposit with the defendant were attached by the plaintiff. Among other
defenses the defendant pleaded that under the Order a license had to be
obtained by the plaintiff from the Treasury Department for the payments
of the sum demanded and that no such license had been granted. The Court
held that the duty to apply for a license rested on the defendant and not on
the plaintiff. This seems to be the better and more reasonable view. Under
the German Foreign Exchange Law no license is required for a law suit but
the court may adjourn the case at any time upon request of one of the parties
45. As to the first defense the court justifies its opinion under U. S. v. Belmont, 301
U. S. 324 (1937). But the present political and economic conditions are quite different;
see pp. 000-000.
46. A transaction without license being illegal, the lack of a necessary license should
be considered by the court ex officio. Decisions like Sabl v. Laenderbank, N. Y. L. J.,
October 29, 1941, p. 1268, col. 7, where the question of a license is nIot considered, seem
to indicate that the court does not hold a license to be prerequisite for an adjudication
of liability.
47. N. Y. L. J., Nov. 26, 1941, p. 1665, col. 4. The Court held that by no fair, reason-
able and sensible construction can an intention be implied from the Order "to interrupt
the orderly and established processes of the law, or to impair the efficacy of judicial
process or to interfere with or obstruct the administration of justice, or to inhibit the
delivery of such property into custadia legis, or to prevent the courts, their processes
and officers from pursuing and discharging their normal duties and functions."
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until a license is procured. In Germany and in Switzerland a license is neces-
sary for the execution on property of a "blocked" person.48
Problems of Conflict of Laws
The important question arises, whether foreign exchange laws are to be
recognized and applied by the courts of a country where its courts have juris-
diction and the case is generally to be adjudicated under the foreign law.
Does this mean that the exchange restrictions of the foreign coufitry govern
the case and that the defendant is entitled to refuse the performance prohibited
under such restrictions? The question does not seem to have been definitely
settled, particularly not in consideration of the present world situation. Up
to the present war the European countries with the exception of Great Britain
have regularly rejected the idea of applying or recognizing the exchange laws
of foreign countries. Exchange restrictions are held to have no extra terri-
torial effect and to be a violation of the Public Order.4 9
The consideration that the United States cannot expect recognition of their
foreign funds control in European countries, could not affect decisions of the
courts in this country, as long as there was no foreign funds control in the
United States. But this country's point of view might now be changed.
In some cases where the Soviet Government confiscated the property of
their nationals, the New York Court of Appeals held that such confiscatory,
decrees were against the public policy of the United States and did not pre-
vent the victim from obtaining relief here as far as jurisdiction could be
acquired by attachment.50 Subsequently the United States recognized the
Russian Soviet Government and the Supreme Court took the point of view
that by this recognition all decrees of the So~riet Government as a de jure
government were validated ex tune. The confiscatory decrees were recognized,
unless American citizens were affected, and applied to assets within the United
States. 1
The Court of Appeals of New York, for the same reason oveiruled its
former decisions and denying an extra-territorial effect to the constitutional
48. DAs DvisENramT EunopAs, supra note 2, at section on Germany, Chapter 9 and
Switzerland Chapter 9.
49. Germany, decision of Kammergericht, Oct. 27, 1932; (1932) JuaRsrrscan WoCHEN-
scMnnr 3773 (The Hungarian foreign exchange laws are irreconcilable with the German
laws). Switzerland: decision of Schweizerisches Bundesgericht, 60 BGE II, 390; 64
BGE I, 273. Schweizer Juristen-Zeitung 38. Jg. S. 33 (July 15, 1941) declares the
application of German foreign exchange laws as against public policy of its own country.
We find the same point of view in the decisions of the highest courts of The Netherlands,
March 30, 1936, of former Austria Sept. 25, 1934 in (1936) Juristische Wochenschrift
1870, 1871, and of Czechoslovakia Nov. 3, 1933, in (1934) Juristische Wochenschrift 1136.
50. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925);
Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 897 (1934).
51. United States v. Belmont, 301 U. S. 324 (1925).
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protection as to property, applied the same rule as the United States Supreme
Court.52
These decisions seem to indicate that the rule would not be the same where
the government is not recognized by the United States, e.g., the German
Government in the Bohemian Moravian territory, in Belgium and all other
occupied countries. But in Werfel v. Zivnostenska Bank,53 where the plaintiff
sought recovery of money deposited with a bank in Czechoslovakia, reversed
the judgment for the plaintiff rendered by the Supreme Court and recognized
the validity of the foreign exchange laws promulgated by the German Gov-
ernment as a de facto government. The complaint was dismissed.5 4
In Branderbil v. Hamburg America Line55 the Appellate Term held "that
the contract of passage insofar as it related to the right to demand a refund
upon cancellation of the scheduled sailing, was performable in Germany
and hence all matters connected with its performance are governed by the
laws of Germany. Since the action is between German nationals on a contract
performable in Germany, the so called Devisen (foreign exchange) laws of
that country must be held to apply, 'however objectionable' we may consider
them. (Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahngesslschaft, 277 N. Y. 474-479). Un-
der the Devisen laws plaintiff is entitled to refund only in blocked marks,
payable in Germany."856
In two recent cases, the New York Supreme Court gave judgments for the
plaintiff and distinguished the Wertel case as decided by the Appellate Division
on the ground that in the Werfel case a license to pay the deposit had been
made and denied by the foreign government, whereas in the case under
consideration no such application had been made.57  The latter case58 was
52. United States v. The Manhattan Co., 276 N. Y. 396, 12 N. E. (2d) 518 (1938).
53. 260 App. Div. 747, 752, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 1001, 1005 (1940): "It is impossible
to treat such decrees as violating the laws of nations and as not subject to respect by the
courts of the United States." See also The Denny, 40 F. Supp. 92 (D. C. N. J. 1941).
54. The Court of Appeals reversed this judgment and granted a new trial. Werfel
V. Zivnostenska Banka, Law Report News, Nov. 28, 1941, p. 7. Defendant held not entitled
to summary judgment. Where on a motion for summary judgment the record as sub-
mitted by both parties reveals the existence of conflicting issues of fact, which can
only be resolved by a trial, summary judgment should not be granted. Upon such
a motion, the deciding consideration is the existence of conflicting issues of fact rather
than the sufficiency of the pleadings considered without the supplementary affidavits.
Among the issues to be tried are the terms of the contract; what is the foreign law
which either party claims to be applicable and in what respect may such law have been
rendered inoperative by reason of events happening subsequent to the making of the
contract.
55. N. Y. L. J., Nov. 26, 1941, p. 1673, col. 4. See also Steinfink v. North German
Lloyd S. S. Co., 176 Misc. 413, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1941).
56. We leave aside the question whether the duties arising out of the transportation
contract having become imperformable are actually only to be performed within Germany.
57. Sabl v. Laenderbank, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 29, 1941.
58. Milbert Importing Corp. v. Parent, N. Y. L. J., Mar. 5, 1941, p. 999, col. 2.
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decided on the ground that the bank deposits were located in the United
States and not abroad.
It is submitted that the result of the Wertel case in the Appellate Division
is unsatisfactory from an equitable point of view. Nevertheless from a legal
standpoint we are unable to find that the "distinctions" mentioned above
solve the problem or are justified. The legal question remains in all these
cases subject to foreign laws, whether or not we are compelled to apply
the funds control laws of the foreign country. It has been suggested that the
foreign exchange laws of foreign countries need not be applied by the courts
of this country. 9 We believe that this view is justified, particularly under the
present circumstances.
First of all, in the field of foreign exchange laws, which protect the cur-
rency and assets within a certain country, the distinction between persons
within the country and persons without the country and not the distinction
between citizens and non-citizens is that upon which most of these laws
are based according to the aim and purpose of foreign funds control.60
Foreign exchange regulations as intended and applied at the present time,
are weapons of economic warfare, often as important as measures of military
warfare. If for no other reason, this consideration alone should exclude
the application of the exchange restrictions of certain countries in the American
courts.
0 2
59. Weiden, Foreign Exchange Restrictions, CoNTa moRaRsc LAw PAmPHLETs, series 1,
no. 11, p. 43: "1. Foreign Exchange Restrictions have no extraterritorial effect regardless of
the intention of the foreign legislation. They leave the debt intact. They regulate
only the" stream of capital from one country to another. The American Court has to
give judgment in its own currency ... ." The author, in an able discussion, shows that
the restrictions interfere with the interests of the American creditors to a greater extent
than a foreign bankruptcy law and are not entitled to a higher degree of recognition.
That they are contradictory to our public policy because of their discriminatory effect
and their specific aims.
"It is submitted that the application of conflict rules should in no case thwart the purpose
of the Order." Comment, (1941) 41 CoL. L. REv. 1039, 1055. See also Cohn, Currency
Restrictions and the Conflict of Laws (1939) 55 L. Q. Rav. 552, 557.
60. The German Foreign Exchange Act of Dec. 12, 1938. (Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1733)
§ 5; see the Order, section 5 E.
61. The courts of Switzerland-a country with a public policy very similar to ours-
do not apply foreign exchange laws of other countries even in cases where under Conflict
of Laws rules foreign law has to be applied. Cf. DAs DvszsmxvwT EuXoPAs, supra, note
2, at section on Switzerland, Chapter 3, II.
62. Ellis, Exchange Control in Central Europe, 59 HAvARD ECON o c STUDns, 290.
BmDER, PRamcrLc AsPrFos oF FoRaaGN PRoPERTI CONTROL, 2: "In the economics of war
foreign exchange control indeed plays an important part. The belligerents use this
control. . . . The leader of the non-belligerent democracies, the United States, has un-
hesitatingly adapted itself to the lightning necessities of economic political strategy.
Though hampered by delicate problems of foreign policy which had to be handled by the
State Department, the Treasury has blow by blow replied to every conquest by every
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We are not called upon to respect foreign economic warfare rules. That
does not mean that our courts would not have to give effect to the exchange
restrictions of friendly nations. No uniform rule can he applied and the
political situation has to be taken into consideration. We might expect that
our courts would follow the ideas as expressed by Justice Pecora in Amstel
Bank, N. V. v. Guarantee Trust Campany of New Yorkes that "In withholding
recognition to the Nazi regime in continental Netherlands, the government
of the United States has made a determination of the policy which our courts
should follow. Therefore, any German decree promulgated in the Netherlands
should be given no force or effect whatsoever in the determination of ques-
tions involving property in this State." The importance of political con-
siderations is stressed too in Sullivan v. The States of Sao Paolo and of Rio
Grande do Sul,6 4 where the foreign funds control of a foreign State, with
which we are in amity, is indirectly recognized.
Neither recognition nor force and effect should be given to any expropriation
done forcibly and wrongfully by an aggressor nation. 65
But the Netherland decrees, mentioned supra footnote 6 were upheld
in American Courts as "a measure of protection not of expropriation. Its
purpose is to conserve not to confiscate, to protect the rights of individuals
not to destroy them." 6
According to the circumstances of the case the following considerations may
apply as well: Foreign exchange regulations are of fiscal character. Their
purpose is the strengthening of the financial power of the government or
country and they are handled and executed by the financial department of
the government. For this reason they have no extraterritorial effect.6 7  Fur-
thermore, they contradict the public policy of the other country where per-
formance can be had or compelled. These laws may de facto prevent or delay
payments to be made by a person within the country but cannot impair con-
tractual rights or property of persons without the country. 68 These reasons
apply with greater force where a country for its own emergency purposes is
aggressor since April 1940". Dietrich, The International Significance of the Foreign Exchange
Law (1935) JuRrsmr.scHF WocHENscmm r 3014: "Emergency Laws which are directed
as warlike or economic measures against certain countries, are not recognized either
by the inimical or the neutral countries" (translated). The article denies that the German
foreign exchange regulations have the character of a warlike measure.
63. N. Y. L. J., Nov. 29, 1941, p. 1728, col. 6. Cf. Feuchtwanger v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Co., 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 518 (1941).
64. 122 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
65. Price v. Gestia, Inc., N. Y. L. J., Dec. 10, 1941, p. 1900, col. 6.
66. Anderson v. N. V. Transandine Handelsmaatschappy, et al., N. Y. L. J., May 25,
1941, p. 2320, col. 5.
67. Weiden, op. cit. supra, note 61, at 13.
68. This point of view is stressed by the following German authorities: 151 Entscheid-
ungen des Reichsgerichts in Civilsachen 116; Decision of Kammergericht (1936) Jumsnsclm
WocEmx'sc~ma-r 2449; see also note 2, supra.
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compelled to control the foreign funds and the recognition of laws of another
country would weaken the effect of the application of Its own regulations.
The restricted function of such laws leads to the question whether they are
substantive or adjective laws. As we have already seen they have no expro-
priatory effect 69 and do not deprive anyone of his ownership or right. They
restrict only certain functions and this only temporarily. That contracts,
intended to be in fraude= legis or contra legem, may be void under such regu-
lations does not determine their character. We may well ask: whether the
application of foreign laws of that kind is to be denied on the ground that
their true character is an adjective one?
The conclusion is, that under the rules of conflict of laws, comity may be
urged to give effect and recognition to foreign laws, but foreign exchange legisla-
tion of other countries is purely local and should have no extraterritorial effect
unless advantageous to the economic policy of the United States.
69. See supra, notes 33, 48.
